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6.1  Introduction 
During the past few years securities transaction taxes (STTs) have been de- 
bated in a number of countries. In some places, the debate has focused on the 
effects of  changing technology and deregulation for sustaining or removing 
transaction taxes. In others, shortages of revenues and a change in atmosphere 
from the 1980s have led to talk of instituting taxes anew. The U.S.  government, 
for example, reviewed a proposal during the  1990 budget negotiations for a 
broad-based 0.5 percent tax on transactions in stocks, bonds, and exchange- 
traded derivatives. The Congressional Research Service estimated at the time 
that such a tax might raise $10 billion in revenue, and this figure has been 
widely cited in subsequent discussions of STTs. Moreover, in 1993 the Clinton 
administration proposed a fixed fourteen-cent tax on transactions in futures 
contracts and options on futures. 
Based on this, it seems safe to conclude that STTs are important because of 
their clear and current policy relevance. However, there is at least one other 
reason that recent international experiences with transaction taxes are of inter- 
est: STTs reveal the nature and scope of powerful underlying changes in inter- 
national capital markets, and offer a glimpse into a future in which government 
policy not so much disciplines, but is instead disciplined by, competition in 
modem capital markets. 
In this paper we consider the international experience with STTs. We argue 
that this experience is in many ways quite varied. There is, for example, an 
almost bewildering variety of details in their nature, size, and implementation. 
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Transaction tax rates may vary with the type of financial instrument (equities 
typically being taxed at higher rates than debt instruments or derivatives), with 
the location of trade (on or off an exchange, at home or abroad), and with the 
identity of the buyer or  seller (domestic or foreign resident, market maker, or 
general trader). But we also point out a number of similarities across countries. 
For example, as table 6.1 shows, while many countries currently impose STTs 
of varying sizes, there is a marked recent trend toward lower taxes.' To empha- 
size the differences and underlying similarities in some detail, we  begin by 
describing the apparently dissimilar experiences of two countries, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
Next we  try to provide an overall framework for understanding STTs. We 
propose two principles that might be used to rationalize transaction tax rates 
across securities. The first principle is that transactions which give rise to the 
same pattern of payoffs should pay the same tax.  Although this seems appeal- 
ing on prior grounds, we show that it is conceptually impossible to apply this 
principle consistently. Accordingly, most actual tax systems rely on a second 
principle, that transactions which use the same resources should pay the same 
tax. Different countries tax different types of resources: Sweden, for example, 
taxes domestic brokerage services (the Swedish resources used in matching 
buyers and sellers), whereas the United Kingdom taxes registration (the legal 
transfer of ownership of U.K. equities). 
Any tax gives people an incentive to change their behavior to reduce their 
tax liability. We argue that in the case of STTs, several changes in behavior are 
relevant. First, investors can change the location of trade, moving transactions 
off-exchange or abroad. Second, investors can trade substitute securities which 
generate payoffs similar to those whose transactions are taxed. Third, investors 
can choose not to trade, accepting a change in the payoffs they receive in order 
to reduce their STT liability. We discuss the importance of each of these behav- 
ioral changes for different STT systems, in particular the Swedish and British 
systems. We  show that offshore trading has been a particularly important re- 
sponse to  the  Swedish equity STT,  while  investors have  responded to the 
Swedish fixed-income STT by  trading untaxed local substitutes. The British 
STT cannot be avoided by  trading abroad, but it does stimulate trading in un- 
taxed substitute assets and also seems to reduce total trading volume to some 
degree. 
In  addition to examining the Swedish and British cases, we  look  at the 
econometric evidence on  the  elasticity of  trading volume with  respect to 
changes in transaction taxes. There are a number of estimates of this elasticity 
in the literature; however, few take into account the margins of  substitution 
that we describe. 
1. Sweden, Finland, and Taiwan have recently cut or removed altogether their turnover taxes. 
Several other countries, such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom have recently consid- 
ered reductions in existing tax rates. Table 6.1  Transactions Taxes around the World (through 1993) 
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Stamp duty tax 
Additional stamp tax removed in 1991 
May be avoided by trading off 
exchange 
May be avoided by trading off 
exchange 
No tax ex country; maximum of 
10,000 Belgian francs 
No tax ex country; maximum of 2,500 
Belgian francs 
Waived if both parties foreign, 
eliminated in 1992 
Tax on trades > I  million francs, rate 
is doubled on smaller transactions, 
may be  avoided by trading ex country 
Residents only 
Tax may be avoided by trading ex 
country 
May be avoided by trading off market 
May be avoided by  trading off market 
Tax may be avoided by trading ex 
country 
May be avoided by trading ex country 
Maximum $100; may be avoided by 
trading off exchange 
Eliminated in 1992 
May be avoided by trading off 
exchange; eliminated in 1992 
May he avoided by trading off 
exchange 
Maximum S$l00, may be avoided by 
trading off exchange 
Purchases only; eliminated in  1992 
Tax may be avoided by trading ex 
country; eliminated in  1991 
Tax may be avoided by  trading ex 
country 
Tax may be avoided by trading ex 
country 
Tax may be avoided by trading ex 
country 
On trades over f5.000 
On purchases only 
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We conclude by drawing some lessons for the U.S. debate. Some proponents 
of an STT favor it on the grounds that it would reduce trading volume, while 
others seem more interested in the revenue that might be raised by the tax. An 
STT will disappoint  both types of  proponent  if  it causes investors to move 
trading into offshore markets or untaxed assets. Accordingly we argue that an 
STT along British lines would be far more workable than a Swedish-style STT. 
Even  a  British-style  STT, however,  would  likely  lead  to major behavioral 
changes and we argue that the widely cited figure of $10 billion in revenue for 
a 0.5 percent STT is too optimistic. 
6.2  Case Studies 
6.2.1  Transaction Taxes in Sweden 
Summary of  the Swedish Transaction Tax Regime 
Sweden’s recent experiment with transaction taxes began in January  1984 
with a levy of  fifty basis points on both  the purchase  and sale of  equities.* 
Support for the tax came from the Labour Party-the  tax  was approved by 
Parliament over the objections of the Finance Ministry and business sectors. 
Labour did not view trading in itself as undesirable; however, it objected to the 
idea that bright young people were being paid so much for performing  what 
seemed to them essentially unproductive tasks. 
Partly as a result of this sentiment, the tax was levied directly on registered 
Swedish brokerage services. Such services (plus those of a registered Swedish 
exchange bank) were required for local stock transactions of meaningful size 
between domestic residents  as well as those between  domestic  and foreign 
residents. Trades between two foreign principals were taxed only if they in- 
volved a security registered in Sweden. No tax was levied on transfers of stock 
ownership unless a broker was involved. For example, no tax was levied on 
gifts or inheritances  of  stock. In addition, private trades involving domestic 
entities were free of taxation, provided that the trades were small enough and 
the entity did not trade too frequently. 
The initial legislation also included a tax on stock options. The tax was for 
two hundred basis points (for round-trip transactions), calculated as a percent- 
age of the option premium. In addition, exercise of the option was treated like 
a transaction in the underlying stock, thereby resulting in an additional levy of 
one hundred basis points (based upon the exercise price).’ As the tax was in- 
2. The tax was announced on October 24, 1983; that day the Swedish All-Share equity index 
fell 2.2 percent. See Umlauf (1993). 
3. Unlike options, warrants were taxed on the amount of stock they (potentially) represented, 
and at the same rate as  stocks. Conversions from warrants into  stock were not taxed. Futures 
transactions in equity-linked instruments were taxed at the same rate as stock transactions, with 
the tax applying to the underlying notional amount. 281  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
tended to resemble a kind of  sales tax, that is, a tax on final consumption of 
local brokerage services, interdealer trades, which were viewed as “intermedi- 
ate” and not final trades, were exempted. 
Over the following two years, the government came under pressure to raise 
more revenue from the tax. In July  1986, Parliament acceded, doubling the 
rates on equity and equity-derivative transactions.“ Moreover, in early  1987, 
Parliament broadened the scope of the tax to include interdealer equity trades 
(at one hundred basis points per round trip, half the rate of the brokerage tax). 
Also in early 1987, several large losses in interest-rate futures and options 
were announced. The largest and most highly criticized of these were the city 
of Stockholm (which lost SEK [Swedish kronor] 450 million) and the insur- 
ance company Folksam (which lost SEK 300 million). Soon thereafter Stig 
Malm, chairman both of the Swedish Trade Union Council and of  Folksam, 
attacked the money markets “for creating economic instability and excessive 
wage differentials” (see Lybeck 1991, 162). In September 1987, through the 
trade union council, Malm proposed a turnover tax to “reduce the overly large 
and socially worthless activities on the money market” (Lybeck 1991, 156). 
The government followed up on Malm’s initiative, although its official reason- 
ing for a turnover tax on money-market instruments was to create “neutrality” 
with the stock market’s tax. While the government actually worked out a legis- 
lative prototype almost immediately, the fixed-income turnover tax did not ac- 
tually take effect until January 1, 1989. 
The tax applied to fixed-income securities, including government debt and 
associated derivatives, such as interest-rate futures and options. The rates on 
these instruments varied, but were considerably  lower than those on equity, 
reaching a maximum of only fifteen basis points of the underlying notional or 
cash amount. For example, the tax rate on a round-trip transaction was three 
basis points for bonds with maturities exceeding five years, one basis point for 
one-year bonds, and 0.2 basis points for maturities of less than ninety days.5 
Beginning in 1989, the political climate began to change. Disappointment 
with the revenues raised, and concerns that taxes on the money market merely 
raised the costs of government borrowing, led to an erosion in political support 
for turnover taxes. The taxes on fixed-income securities were abolished as of 
April  15, 1990. On January  1, 1991, tax rates on the remaining instruments 
were cut by one-half. Then on December 1, 1991, all remaining security trans- 
action taxes were completely removed. 
4. The tax increase was announced on March 11, 1986; that day the Swedish All-Share index 
declined by 0.8 percent. 
5. Intermediate maturities received intermediate rates: four-, three-, and two-year bonds were 
taxed at 2.6, 2.0, and  1.5 basis points, respectively. For securities with maturities of  less than one 
year, the tax levy increased linearly with the investor’s holding period. The tax on fixed-income 
futures contracts was levied on the notional amount, at a rate equivalent to that on the underlying 
instrument. 282  John Y. Campbell and Kenneth A. Fmt 
Effects on Volume and Location of Equity Transactions 
Several studies have  argued that the stock transaction tax had a negative 
effect on local Swedish trading (see, for example, Umlauf  1993 and Ericsson 
and Lindgren 1992). Table 6.2 reviews the evidence, showing the location of 
trading in  stocks of about a dozen large Swedish companies.6  Unfortunately, 
data prior to 1988 are not available. The data include volume in Stockholm, 
London,  and  the  United   state^,^  and  trading  in  both  restricted  and  un- 
restricted shares.8 
Table 6.2 clearly shows a high level of offshore trading in 1988 and  1989, 
when the stock turnover tax was at its maximum level. For example, only 27 
and 23 percent of trading in Ericsson, Sweden’s most actively traded company, 
took place in Stockholm in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Comparable average 
fractions across all stocks in table 6.2 were 61 and 57 percent of total volume. 
The fraction of trade in Stockholm continued to decline through 1991, when it 
reached a low of  52 percent. By  1992 (after taxes had been completely re- 
moved), trade in  Sweden had increased to 41 percent for Ericsson and to 56 
percent for the average stock in table 6.2.9 
The effect of the tax on local trading volume does not appear to be instanta- 
neous. For example, even though the tax was instituted prior to 1988, the frac- 
tion of trading taking place in Stockholm declined from 1988 through 1991, 
when tax rates were cut. Such lagged trading volume responses are not too 
surprising in practice, as it is likely that shifts in institutional capacity and 
expertise-needed  inputs in the production of brokerage services-take  time. 
The tax on equity transactions was avoided in different ways and to different 
extents by  different types of traders. Foreign investors were most able to use 
non-Swedish brokers for transactions in Swedish stocks. One way to see this 
behavior in  the data is to compare the degree of  trading migration  in un- 
restricted versus restricted shares. This sheds some light on the relative behav- 
ior of foreign and domestic clienteles since unrestricted shares are dispropor- 
tionately owned by foreigners and restricted shares are owned exclusively by 
domestics  . 
6. We  thank Lief Vindevag of the Stockholm Stock Exchange for supplying us with the data 
used in tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
7. Trading in the United States is small, and is predominantly on the NASDAQ (an over-the- 
counter electronic exchange). This probably reflects liquidity considerations (London and Stock- 
holm are open during the same hours, and therefore help provide liquidity for one another) more 
than it does the profile of shareholder domiciles. 
8. Some Swedish shares cany ownership restrictions, while others do not. Restricted shares can 
only be owned and voted by Swedish nationals. Transactions taxes apply to trades in both types 
of shares, as long as a registered Swedish brokerage house is involved. 
9. Other authors have found responses of local trading volume to transactions costs, including 
taxes, at least as large as this. Lindgren and Westlund (1990), for example, estimate the long-run 
elasticity of  trading volume on the Stockholm market with respect to transactions costs to be 
approximately -  1. Jackson and O’Donnell (1985) estimate elasticities in the range of -  1 to -  1.7 
in their study of U.K. stocks. 283  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
Table 6.2  'hading of Swedish Stocks inside Sweden (percentage of turnover in 
London, New York,  and Stockholm taking place in Stockholm) 


































































































Average  61%  57%  56%  52%  56% 
Source: Central Bank of Sweden. 
Table 6.3 provides this breakdown, taking those companies from table 6.2 
for which there is liquid trade in restricted shares. The table reports the fraction 
of  trade in unrestricted shares that took place in  Stockholm relative to total 
trade in New  York, London, and  Stockholm. The first point to  note is that, 
during the 1988-91  period when the tax was in place, the fraction of trading 
taking place in  Stockholm was much lower for unrestricted shares. For ex- 
ample, during 1988, only 47 percent of trade in unrestricted shares took place 
in Stockholm (versus 61 percent for all shares-see  table 6.2). After the tax 
was removed, however, trading of unrestricted shares in Stockholm rebounded 
considerably, rising from 40 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 1992. This evi- 
dence suggests that foreign investors tended to substitute more toward trading 
abroad than did domestic investors, who substituted more toward not trading 
at all. 
Naturally, domestic investors also had an incentive to evade the tax when 
they  did trade. However, for them it was  harder. Domestic investors had to 
establish an offshore domicile or company if they were to avoid using a Swed- 
ish broker for transactions. And they were taxed in the process: a tax equal to 
three times the round-trip tax on equity applied to funds moved offshore. 
Perhaps the clearest way to measure foreign investors' response to the tax is 
to use data on the trading patterns of specific foreign investors. One such data 284  John Y.  Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
Table 6.3  'kading of Swedish Unrestricted Shares inside Sweden (percentage of 
turnover in London, New York, and Stockholm taking place in 
Stockholm) 






































































































Average  47%  42%  42%  40%  50% 
Source: Central Bank of  Sweden. 
base is maintained by Frank Russell Securities, Inc. Russell monitors the trans- 
actions costs paid by a group of large U.S. institutional clients.Io These clients 
traded large amounts of international equities. It is worth noting that these U.S. 
institutions found trading in the United  States considerably  cheaper than in 
other countries. Figure 6.1 reports average taxes, fees, and agency commis- 
sions paid by these institutions when trading in securities from the world's ten 
largest equity markets. Average direct costs total about thirty basis points in 
the United States, compared with about seventy-six basis points in Japan and 
ninety-six basis points in the United Kingdom. 
Figure 6.2 depicts average round-trip trading costs paid by large U.S. institu- 
tions when trading Swedish equities. The figure shows that during the 1987-92 
sample period, commissions remained roughly constant, while taxes paid fell 
10. The data base, assembled by Richard Kos and Thomas Morton, analyzes the trades of U.S. 
institutional clients that are members of Russell's portfolio verification service. Altogether the data 
include well over two-million transactions, recorded over six years (1987-92),  from approximately 
five thousand actively managed portfolios. Equity securities from over thirty-five counties are rep- 
resented in the data. 285  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
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Fig. 6.1 
Source: Frank Russell Securities, Inc. 
1992 global trading costs, ten largest markets 
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Fig. 6.2  Round-trip trading costs in Swedish Equities for U.S. institutional 
investors 
Source; Frank Russell Securities. Inc. 
from 136 basis points in 1987 to only 6 basis points in 1992. During the 1987- 
90 period there was no change in the statutory tax rate, yet the average round- 
trip tax payment fell by over 100  basis points. Thus, whereas these U.S. institu- 
tions paid 68 percent (1  36 basis points relative to the statutory rate of 200) of 
the statutory tax in  1987, they were paying only 13 percent (26/200) of the 
statutory rate by  1990. U.S. institutions (and their brokers) were increasingly 
able to evade the tax by eliminating the use of Swedish brokers when trading 
in Sweden or by exchanging Swedish securities in London or New York. 
It appears also that the Swedish tax had only a marginal effect on the volume 
of trade in Swedish equities by  foreign institutions. Figures 6.3A and 6.3B 286  John Y.  Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
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Fig. 6.3A  Ratio of median equity turnover ratios, Stockholm versus the United 
States 
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Fig. 6.3B  Ratio of median turnover ratios, average of Stockholm versus that of 
sixteen other markets 
show the Swedish-share turnover rates for Russell's  investors relative to U.S.- 
share turnover and to average total turnover. There is little evidence that total 
trading volume in Swedish stocks responded strongly to changes in taxation of 
trades in Stockholm. This lends additional  support to the view that interna- 
tional investors easily evaded Swedish turnover taxes. 287  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
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Fig. 6.5  Volume of trade in Swedish money markets, futures market 
Effects on Volume and Location of Fixed-Income Transactions 
The transaction tax on fixed-income securities had a larger impact on local 
trading volume than did the tax on stocks. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the trading 
volume in Swedish government bills and bonds and in futures on bills and 
bonds, respectively." 
11. We thank  Pehr Wissen and the Bank  of Sweden for providing the data in figures 6.4 and 6.5. 288  John Y.  Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
There are several noteworthy  aspects to these data. First, the effect of the 
tax (proposed in late 1987 and implemented in early 1989) seems to be quite 
large. During the first week of the tax, bond trading volume fell by about 85 
percent from its average during the summer of  1987.12  Trading in futures on 
bonds and bills (in figure 6.5) fell by about 98 percent over the same period. 
Trade in options essentially  disappeared. The effects were less dramatic for 
bills, whose trading fell by only about 20 percent. 
Second, much of the volume decline in futures occurred in anticipation of 
the tax. However, there was also a large decline in volume in January 1989, the 
month when the tax was instituted. One possible explanation for the anticipa- 
tory decline is that low levels of  future liquidity raise the current risk of il- 
liquidity. If the risk of low liquidity is high, investors who value liquidity most 
will prefer to trade securities with lower liquidity risk, thereby reducing current 
liquidity in futures. 
Third, these effects ran in reverse once the tax was removed in April 1990. 
Trading volume subsequently increased, in both bonds and bills, spot and fu- 
tures. At the same time, the yield on bonds relative to that on bills fell. This 
could be explained by the liquidity arguments above and by the high tax rate 
on bonds relative to bills. 
Why does fixed-income  volume appear more sensitive than  stock-market 
volume, even with much smaller taxes, and with no viable offshore replace- 
ments? The answer would appear to lie in the relative ease with which substi- 
tutes for bonds can be created-substitutes  which avoid the tax even if they 
are local. For example, the market for Swedish debentures (which were not 
subject to the tax) became more active when the tax was imposed. The market 
for  VRNs  (variable-rate  notes)  also  grew  rapidly.I3 VRNs  avoid  taxation 
because  they  are traded by  counterparties,  without  a broker.  Finally, FRAs 
(forward-rate agreements) quickly took the place of futures markets in bills 
and bonds.14  By moving from futures to forwards, transaction taxes could eas- 
ily be avoided with little change in payoff patterns.I5 Swaps performed a simi- 
lar service for longer-maturity instruments, serving as a close substitute for 
futures on bonds. 
Because trade in fixed-income securities can move so easily into debentures 
and forward contracts, the turnover tax raised little revenue, and a good deal 
less than the authorities expected. Whereas the Finance Ministry initially esti- 
mated tax revenues from fixed-income transactions at SEK 1500 million per 
12. Lybeck (1991) estimates the elasticity of Swedish money-market trading with respect to the 
13. VRNs cany longer maturities, but are priced more like short-maturity bills because their 
14. See Lybeck (1991). 
15. Indeed, the substitutability between futures and forwards became quite close; beginning in 
turnover tax to be 3.0. 
value is reset every three months at par. 
mid- 1989, the FRA market was standardized to the futures-contract expiration dates. 289  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
year, the realized revenue averaged only about 50 million per year, reaching 
only 80 million in 1989. 
The fixed-income tax created considerable substitution toward other Swed- 
ish instruments, with little migration offshore. If the tax had remained in place, 
however, offshore migration might also have occurred. There were no barriers 
to trading SEK-denominated bonds, bills, and associated derivatives in foreign 
markets. Presumably, offshore migration did not occur because foreign invest- 
ors are not so active in Swedish money markets, and because it is so easy to 
create forward contracts for fixed-income instruments. Thus, the reason for 
the lack of migration in fixed-income trade was not that offshore trading was 
relatively more costly than it was for stocks, but that there were even less costly 
local alternatives available. 
6.2.2  Transaction Taxes in the United Kingdom 
Summary of the U.K. Transaction Tax Regime 
The securities transaction tax in the United Kingdom is known as “stamp 
duty.” As the name suggests, stamp duty began as a tax on the transfer of  a 
financial instrument from one owner to another, a transfer which could only be 
made legally effective by  an official stamp applied to the instrument. Thus 
stamp duty is a tax on the registration of ownership of a financial asset. In 1986 
the U.K. government closed certain loopholes in the application of stamp duty 
by introducing a “stamp duty reserve tax” (SDRT) which substitutes for stamp 
duty itself and is paid at the same rate.I6 In  what follows we use the term 
“stamp duty” to refer to both stamp duty proper and the SDRT, and we  use 
“taxable” to mean subject to stamp duty (as opposed to other U.K. taxes that 
are outside the scope of this paper). 
Stamp duty applies to transactions in ordinary shares (common stock, in 
U.S. terminology), and in assets convertible to shares such as convertible un- 
secured loan stock (convertible bonds, in U.S. terminology) while the conver- 
sion option is still exercisable. Futures and options transactions are not taxable, 
but the exercise of an option is treated as a purchase of ordinary shares at the 
exercise price and is therefore taxable. Transactions in the shares of investment 
trusts (closed-end funds, in U.S. terminology) are taxable in the ordinary way, 
as are the transactions carried out by  the managers of investment trusts. Pur- 
chases and redemptions of units in unit trusts (open-end funds, in U.S. termi- 
nology) are taxed as if  they were transactions in the underlying shares held 
16. For example, the SDRT is payable when investors buy shares and then resell them within 
the same two-week London Stock Exchange account period, thereby avoiding the need for a trans- 
fer of registered ownership. The SDRT is also payable on transactions in “renounceable letters of 
allotment or acceptance,” which are traded in place of shares themselves during the six months 
after shares are first issued to the public. 290  John Y. Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
by  the trust. Transactions in fixed-income securities, such as corporate and 
government bonds, are not taxable. 
Stamp duty applies to both  primary and secondary market  transactions. 
When new shares are issued the issuer pays the tax, whereas in secondary mar- 
ket transactions the purchaser pays the tax. Corporate repurchases of  shares 
are also taxable. 
There are a few exemptions from stamp duty. Registered charities are ex- 
empt, as are market makers registered by  the London Stock Exchange when 
they trade in the securities for which they make a market, and member firms 
of the London International Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) when they 
trade to hedge equity options positions or to meet delivery obligations follow- 
ing the exercise of equity options. 
The rate of  stamp duty has varied over the years. In August 1963 the rate 
was lowered from 2 percent to 1 percent, increasing to 2 percent in May  1974, 
falling again to 1 percent in April 1984 and to 0.5 percent in October 1986. In 
its  1990 budget  the British government announced its intention to abolish 
stamp duty altogether when the London Stock Exchange’s Taurus system for 
electronic settlement came on-line. With the collapse of the Taurus develop- 
ment project in the spring of  1993, the future of stamp duty is uncertain. 
Esfects on Market Institutions and Trading Strategies 
To understand the effects of stamp duty, it is important to realize that stamp 
duty is not a tax on the domestic consumption of transactions services. Accord- 
ingly the British system does not make any distinction between domestic and 
foreign investors.” Nor is stamp duty a tax on the domestic production of bro- 
kerage services. Indeed, the City of  London thrives by  providing brokerage 
services for trading in foreign shares, and these transactions are not subject to 
stamp duty. Instead, stamp duty is effectively a tax on registration, the transfer 
of legal ownership of U.K. shares.I8 
Since stamp duty is a tax on registration, investors have an incentive to re- 
duce their consumption of this service by using nominees to hold assets in their 
name (“street name,” in U.S. terminology). An  investor could receive assets 
from the account of another investor using the same nominee without incurring 
a tax liability.19  Recognizing the potential for tax avoidance of this type, the 
British tax authorities distinguish between “custodial nominees,” who perform 
regular custodial functions, and “active nominees,” who in addition may trans- 
17. An exception is that for practical reasons the U.K. tax authorities do not try to collect the 
SDRT on transactions between foreign investors. 
18. Transactions in some non-U.K. shares, mainly South African, Australian, and Irish shares, 
are settled in the United Kingdom using the London Stock Exchange’s Talisman system. Stamp 
duty is payable at the South African and Australian rates for South African and Australian shares, 
while the U.K. and Irish tax authorities share stamp duty revenues for purchases of Irish shares 
through U.K. brokers. 
19. Conversely, stamp duty is payable if an investor does not sell shares but simply changes nom- 
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fer assets between the accounts of their clients. A typical custodial nominee is 
a large U.K. clearing bank (commercial bank, in U.S. terminology). Active 
nominees include domestic clearance services, and depositories that  allow 
claims on assets held in their name to be traded in U.S. stock markets (these 
claims are known as American depository receipts, or ADRs). Transfers of 
shares into the name of an active nominee are taxable at three times the ordi- 
nary rate, compensating to some extent for the free trading which is possible 
once the shares are held by the active nominee. 
More generally, stamp duty generates an incentive for the creation of bearer 
instruments, which can be traded without using registration services. To offset 
this incentive, stamp duty applies at the triple rate on any such creation of 
bearer instruments. For example, shares in Eurotunnel (the company operating 
the channel tunnel) were issued in both the United Kingdom and France. In 
the United Kingdom the shares were registered in the usual way, but in France 
the shares are bearer instruments. Triple stamp duty is payable when a holder 
of U.K. registered Eurotunnel shares converts them to French bearer shares. 
Of  these various devices for economizing on registration services, ADRs 
are the most commonly used. In the last six months of  1992, total trading 
volume in U.K. equities and ADRs on the London Stock Exchange amounted 
to 136.1 billion pounds, of which 10.5 billion pounds were U.K. ADR trading. 
In addition, there were 13.8 billion pounds of U.K. ADR trading in US. mar- 
kets.20  Thus trading in U.K. ADRs accounted for 16 percent of the total (U.K. 
ADR plus U.K. equity) trading in this period. 
There are two other important means by  which investors can reduce their 
liability to U.K. stamp duty. First, investors can switch from trading U.K. equi- 
ties directly to trading U.K.  equity derivatives. Futures transactions incur no 
stamp duty, and options transactions incur duty only when the options are exer- 
cised. Furthermore, LIFFE member firms can hedge equity options transac- 
tions without paying stamp duty. This gives derivatives a substantial tax advan- 
tage for many transactions. The LIFFE reports considerable trading volume in 
futures on the FTSE 100 index of  U.K. equities (2.6 million contracts were 
traded in 1992, up 52 percent from 1991), in FT’SE 100 options (3.1 million 
options in 1992, up 37 percent from 1991), and in options on individual U.K. 
equities (4.6 million options in 1992, down 4 percent from 1991).21 
Second, investors can reduce stamp duty liability by trading less frequently. 
The magnitude of this effect is hard to estimate. Jackson and O’Donnell(l985) 
and Ericsson and Lindgren (1992), in econometric studies of U.K. and interna- 
tional equity turnover, respectively, find that the long-run elasticity of turnover 
with respect to overall transactions costs is in the range of -  1 to -  1.7. That 
20. The U.S.  figures are calculated as follows. In the last six months of  1992 there were $20.4 
billion of trading in U.K.  ADRs listed on the New  York  Stock Exchange, and $3.0 billion of 
trading in U.K.  ADRs listed on the NASDAQ. Converting to sterling at an exchange rate of $1.70 
per pound gives 13.8 billion pounds of U.K. ADR trading in U.S.  markets. 
21. Before March  1992 the equity options were traded on the London Traded Options Market, 
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is, a  10 percent  increase in transactions  costs reduces turnover  by  10 to 17 
percent in the long run. Since U.K.  stamp duty appears to account for about 
half of the total trading costs in U.K. equities, these estimates imply that turn- 
over is less than half of what it might be in the absence of stamp duty. Alterna- 
tively, without relying on econometric studies, one might note that in 1992 the 
ratio of trading volume to market value of domestic equities on the London 
Stock Exchange was only 62 percent of the corresponding ratio for the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ (National Association of Securi- 
ties Dealers Automated Quotations) combined.22 
Despite the availability of various means by which investors can substitute 
away from taxable trading, the stamp duty still has a considerable  tax base. 
Trading volume in U.K.  equities on the London Stock Exchange was 216.9 
billion pounds during calendar 1992, and stamp duty on U.K. equities raised 
830 million pounds in revenue in the fiscal year 1992-93.  The revenue raised 
is somewhat less than the statutory 0.5 percent of trading volume because of 
the various exemptions. These exemptions do  not reduce the liability of foreign 
investors, and figure 6.6 shows that the investors whose U.K. equity transac- 
tions are recorded in the Frank Russell data base pay close to the statutory fifty 
basis points per round-trip transaction. This is in marked contrast to the Swed- 
ish evidence reported earlier.23 
6.3  Securities Transaction Taxes and Market Responses 
By taxing an activity, the government creates an incentive to replace it with 
a nontaxed substitute. In the case of securities transaction taxes, the availability 
of alternative securities or trading methods creates many possible means of tax 
avoidance. Investors,  intermediaries,  and securities issuers can all attempt to 
pursue lower-cost trades through a variety of alternatives. Trading may migrate 
into substitute securities or it may move out of the government’s physical tax 
jurisdiction, or both. 
In this section, we examine different means of taxing transactions and the 
resulting tax incentives for migration and financial innovation. We first look at 
two rules that countries seem to apply in choosing which transactions to tax 
and how much to tax them. We argue that regardless of which rule is used, its 
application will create incentives for participants to avoid the taxes. We then 
turn to describe various ways in which taxes might change behavior (other than 
simply inducing investors not to trade): moving transactions to offshore or off- 
market locations;  changing  the nature of  securities that investors  and inter- 
mediaries  trade; and changing the kinds of  securities that issuers are likely 
to provide. 
22. These figures come from the 1993 edition of the London Stock Exchange  Fact Book. 
23. Note, however, that the Frank Russell data base does not include transactions in U.K. ADRs 
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Fig. 6.6  Round-trip trading costs in U.K. equities for US.  institutional 
investors 
Source: Frank Russell Securities, Inc. 
6.3.1  What to Tax and How Much to Tax It? 
Any attempt to tax transactions must face questions of what constitutes a 
transaction and how much to tax different transaction types. While it seems 
simple enough to define a transaction as the transfer of legal ownership of a 
financial security, that definition does not go very far toward building a transfer 
tax program. No actual systems equally tax all financial ownership transfers; 
all exempt (partially or completely) certain types of securities or transfers be- 
tween certain parties. 
The main consequence of  such selective taxation is a high degree of com- 
plexity in rates and scope. In the British system, for example, transfers of do- 
mestic  equities and  convertible  bonds  are taxable  but  transfers  of  straight 
bonds are not. In the Japanese system, straight bond transfers are taxable but 
at a lower rate than convertible bond transfers, which in turn are taxed at a 
lower rate than equity transfers. In the Swedish system, the statutory tax rate 
depended on who was trading as well as what was traded; for example, the 
taxes could be avoided by using offshore brokers for trades in Swedish equi- 
ties. Moreover, derivative securities are taxed in many different ways: in the 
British system, futures transactions are untaxed, while options are taxed only 
upon exercise. In the Japanese and Swedish systems, futures and options are 
taxed, but at a much lower rate than either bonds or stocks. 
One is naturally led to ask whether there are any underlying principles that 
can be used to determine which asset transfers are taxable and at what rate. 
Two principles are appealing on a priori grounds, and these seem to underlie 
at least some features of the systems we see in different countries. A first prin- 
ciple is that transactions that generate the same payoffs should pay the same 
tax. A second principle is that transactions that use the same resources should 
pay the same tax. The first principle emphasizes the outcome from a trans- 
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6.3.2  Taxing Transactions According to Their Payoff Patterns 
Despite the a priori appeal of taxing transactions according to the payoffs 
they generate, this approach rapidly runs into difficulties. The problem arises 
from what we saw in the examples above-that  for any given tax regime, be- 
havioral responses will occur to undermine it. The effect of a turnover tax is 
rarely just to discourage trade. It also encourages a move  in the location of 
taxed services, or a switch to an instrument which is a close, but more lightly 
taxed, substitute. These problems make it difficult or impossible to implement 
a system which taxes a transaction according to the payoffs it generates. 
To take an example, consider what the presence of derivative securities does 
to a system that tries to tax payoff patterns. As is well-known, derivatives de- 
liver payoffs which can be replicated through trading the underlying assets 
(along with short-term borrowing and lending).24  For example, the payoff pat- 
tern obtained by purchasing and holding an option can be replicated by under- 
taking a dynamic trading strategy in the underlying asset, and, reciprocally, the 
payoff pattern from buying and holding the underlying asset can be replicated 
through a dynamic trading strategy in the option. Only the intensity of trading 
separates the two strategies for any given return pattern. Once a transaction 
tax is imposed, some payoff  patterns will likely be cheaper to achieve with 
derivatives, and others will be cheaper to achieve with the underlying asset. 
Transaction taxes will generally not be able to equate the tax burdens from 
trading the two  instrument^.^^ 
To see this, suppose that the system taxes the purchase of shares at rate 7. 
What should the tax rate on options be? A tax rate of zero would clearly en- 
courage investors to substitute away  from trade in the stock. Most investors 
would prefer to adjust their exposures to the stock through trade in the option.26 
Alternatively, suppose a positive tax rate is levied on the option’s market 
price. If  an investor uses the option to duplicate the return from buying and 
holding the stock for, say, a year, a larger number of options transactions will 
be required. For this investor, the option can turn out to be more expensive 
than the stock for all but the lowest option tax  rates. However, for another 
investor, one who wants the downside protection that options offer, the option 
will need to be purchased only once; a low option tax rate will make the option 
less expensive than the stock for this latter investor. A tax on option prices will 
therefore not satisfy the principle of taxing payoff patterns. 
More generally, taxing the market price of  a derivative is, in any case, a 
problematic proposition. After all, it is always possible to redesign a derivative 
24. The replication is precise under simplifying assumptions such as those made by the Black- 
Scholes option-pricing model, and approximate otherwise. 
25. The presence of a transaction tax can also make the derivative an imperfect substitute for 
the underlying asset. In such cases, the replication described above will not be exact. 
26. Of course, even in the absence of taxes, transactions have costs (brokerage fees plus the 
difference between execution price and the middle of the bidask spread). Thus there will be some 
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to include more leverage. For example, futures contracts cannot be taxed ac- 
cording to their market price, as they have a price of zero when written. 
The last possibility might be to tax options’ “deltas”-that  is, the notional 
amount of  the stock an investor would currently need to buy to perform the 
stock-option replication discussed above. This method of taxation would also 
fail to tax transactions  according to payoff patterns. First of all, implementation 
would be a nightmare: option deltas vary with both the market price and the 
strike price of the stock, so that tax rates across options would have to differ, 
and would have to vary over time. Second of all, the previous argument still 
applies: investors who want the return from buying and holding the stock will 
need to buy and sell options frequently if they are to achieve the return through 
options, and will therefore avoid using options; alternatively,  those who prefer 
the payoff pattern of the option will find that the necessary frequent trading in 
the stock will make options the cheaper alternative for all but the highest op- 
tion tax rates. 
Thus it seems clear that no system of tax rates will enable a government to 
tax transactions according to their payoff patterns. Such a system does not in 
any case correspond exactly to any country’s system. However, it does appear 
to have been part of the motivation in Sweden for extending the tax on underly- 
ing stocks and government bonds to futures and options. 
6.3.3  Taxing Transactions according to Their Resource Costs 
An alternative principle of transactions  taxation is to equate the transactions 
tax burden across assets as a fraction of total transactions costs. On this prin- 
ciple, transactions with the same resource costs should be taxed equally. 
For example, by  some measures derivatives represent low-cost means of 
purchasing exposure to an underlying asset. Accordingly, this principle would 
suggest that transactions in derivatives should be lightly taxed compared to 
“expensive” transactions in cash markets. 
This principle can be implemented in several ways. One possibility is to tax 
transactions costs directly; for example, Japanese brokers’ commissions are 
subject to  a  3 percent  sales tax. Another approach is to tax  the notional 
amounts invested, but at lower rates for assets with low transactions  costs. This 
might help explain, for example, what was done in Sweden, with different rates 
on a wide range of  instruments handled by  Swedish brokers. Also, in Japan 
futures transactions are taxed at 0.001  percent, while cash transactions are 
taxed at 0.3 percent for general investors. 
The third interpretation of this principle stresses that “resource costs” refers 
to indirect as well as direct costs. A number of arguments have been made that 
higher trading volumes stimulate negative externalities. These externalities 
typically fall into one of  two groups: (a)  excessive volatility of asset prices, 
higher risk premia, and, therefore, lower levels of investment;*’ and (b) excess 
27. See, for example, Summers and Summers (1989). 296  John Y.  Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
or misallocated  investment in speculative activities.28 Either way,  one might 
imagine a tax system which attempts to tax transactions as a way of compensat- 
ing for the externality and reducing its size. 
Such externalities  provide  a kind of  economic rationale  for transactions 
taxes as “sin” taxes. Such arguments were used by the Swedish Trade Union 
Council in initiating Sweden’s discussion  of  transaction  taxes. The tax rates 
that follow from this application of the resource-cost principle depend on the 
magnitude  of the negative externalities.  In  Sweden, for example, where the 
sentiment focused on the negative consequences of excessive speculation, it is 
perhaps not surprising that tax rates on derivatives were set so high as to practi- 
cally eliminate trade. 
Can governments expect to accomplish their objectives when taxing trans- 
actions according to their “costs”? By taxing transaction inputs, such as bro- 
kerage or  local trading services, taxes can indeed discourage local production 
of those inputs. That is because, in practice, these inputs are relatively inelas- 
tically supplied. In Sweden, for example, there is little question that the equity 
turnover tax  succeeded in hurting  local equity brokers and floor traders, at 
least to the extent that they could not costlessly move their services to offshore 
markets. However, no one has claimed that Sweden’s tax should therefore be 
judged a success. This suggests that the tax’s true objective had never actually 
been to discourage the allocation of local inputs into trading. 
Suppose, instead, that the objective of the tax is to reduce negative externali- 
ties (allegedly) associated with trading “too much.” In this case it is clearly not 
enough simply to discourage local investment in inputs. Externalities due to 
excess volatility or short-termism will not be reduced if total trading remains 
as its original level merely by moving abroad or into local close substitutes. 
Thus, a necessary condition for meeting this objective is for the tax to discour- 
age total trading  In terms of reducing  total volume, the U.K.  tax 
might be considered a success relative to the Swedish taxes. 
6.3.4  Econometric Evidence on Market Responses to Transactions Taxes 
Our case studies have shown that investors respond to transactions taxes by 
reducing the volume of taxable transactions. There is also some econometric 
evidence for this behavior. 
28. Stiglitz (1989) argues that profit-maximizing investors overinvest in information gathering 
relative to the social optimum. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) show that short-horizon trading 
can lead researchers to “herd” on some sources of information and to ignore others. Presumably, 
the costly externalities here are not the misallocation of investor resources, but the potential for 
corporate resource allocation to be  affected by  inefficient investment in information. See Froot, 
Perold, and  Stein (1992) for an analytic review of these issues and that of  excessive volatility. 
Schwert and Seguin (1993) provide a broad overview of the literature. 
29. It is important to emphasize that reducing total volume is by  no means sufficient to ensure 
the tax’s  success. For example, lowering total volume does not ensure that excess volatility is 
reduced (even if it is present to begin with). If the demands of “stabilizing” traders are reduced 
along with the demands of “destabilizing” or noise traders, then the overall effect on excess volatil- 
ity of reduction in volume will be ambiguous. See Froot, Perold, and Stein (1992) for an elahora- 
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The original work on this topic was done by Jackson and O’Donnell(1985), 
who  studied U.K. trading  volume over  the  period  1964-84.  Jackson  and 
O’Donnell estimated an equation of  the form 
u, = a. + aIu,-l  + X,P + e,, 
where u is the log of trading volume and X, is a vector of explanatory variables 
including some contemporaneous and some lagged variables. One of the ex- 
planatory variables, say, XI,,  is a measure of log transactions costs; Jackson and 
O’Donnell call the coefficient on this variable p,, the short-run elasticity of 
trading volume with respect to transactions costs, and they call PI/(  1 -  a,)  the 
long-run elasticity of trading volume with respect to transactions costs since 
this is the effect of  a one-time permanent change in transactions costs after 
trading volume has fully adjusted to its new level. 
Jackson and O’Donnell measure trading volume in a rather unusual way. 
They divide the value of shares traded by  the level of the Financial Times (FT) 
all-share stock price index, instead of  dividing by  the total value of  shares 
outstanding. The latter procedure would give a measure of  turnover; Jackson 
and O’Donnell’s procedure approximates turnover only if the number of shares 
outstanding is fairly constant and if the FT stock price index adequately prox- 
ies the price behavior of the market as a whole. 
To  measure transactions costs, Jackson and O’Donnell assume that other 
costs equal 0.75  percent for a one-way transaction. They add the one-way 
stamp duty rate to this to get a total transactions cost, and then take logs. 
Jackson and O’Donnell also include a large number of  other variables in 
their X, vector. They use the log of the total value of shares outstanding, de- 
flated by  the consumer price index; the log of  expenditure on mergers and 
acquisitions, deflated by  the FT  stock price index; the log of  net  inflows to 
life assurance and  pension funds (the leading institutional investors in  the 
U.K.), again deflated by  the FT price index; the change in the log stock price 
index and the absolute value of this change; and seasonal dummies for the third 
quarter of  every year (to capture low trading volume in the summer) and for 
the first quarter of  1981 and every subsequent year (to capture capital gains 
tax effects). 
In their preferred specification, Jackson and O’Donnell estimate the coeffi- 
cient on lagged log trading volume to be 0.55, and the coefficient on log trans- 
actions costs to be -0.48.  This implies a long-run elasticity of trading volume 
with  respect to transactions costs of  -1.65.  Starting from an initial trans- 
actions tax rate of  2 percent, a reduction to 1 percent is a 0.45 reduction in 
total log transactions costs, which is estimated to increase trading volume by 
about 70 percent. Starting from an initial transactions tax rate of 0.5 percent, 
abolition of the tax is a comparable reduction in total transactions costs with a 
similar estimated effect on trading volume. 
Jackson and O’Donnell also experiment with other specifications and find 
that the estimated long-run elasticity of trading volume with respect to trans- 
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over the period 1970-88, Lindgren and Westlund (1990) estimate the long-run 
elasticity to be in the range of -0.85  to -  1.35. Ericsson and Lindgren (1992) 
extend the approach to international panel data. They estimate the long-run 
elasticity to be in the range of -  1.2 to -  1.5. Thus all these studies give fairly 
similar results. 
There are some small differences in specification between the Lindgren- 
Westlund and Ericsson-Lindgren papers and the original Jackson-O’Donnell 
paper. Lindgren and Westlund use log( 1 + z)  in place of log(z), where z is the 
merger activity variable and the net inflow to institutions variable. This is to 
avoid the implication of the Jackson-O’Donnell specification that stock market 
trading volume would fall to zero if merger activity or net inflow to institutions 
ceased. Ericsson and Lindgren use a standard measure of turnover as the de- 
pendent variable, they drop the merger activity and institutional inflow vari- 
ables, and they include both market size and interest-rate  movements  in the 
vector of regressors. More importantly, they include time and country dummies 
to pick up fixed country effects and common movements  in trading volume 
across countries. 
Although  these studies are suggestive, there are several reasons why their 
results should be treated with some caution. First, the time-series studies tend 
to begin with equations that include long lags and hence a very large number 
of regressors, testing down to a more parsimonious final specification. Jackson 
and  O’Donnell,  for  example,  begin  by  estimating  thirty-seven  coefficients 
when they have eighty-three observations! Even their final equation includes 
nineteen explanatory variables. In this situation it is easy to overfit the data and 
end up with spuriously significant coefficients. 
Second, it is not easy to measure total transactions costs accurately. Trans- 
actions costs include not only bid-ask spreads and brokerage commissions, but 
also the price impact of trading and the effects of capital gains taxes. It is not 
at all clear that these factors can be proxied adequately by any fixed number. 
Third, the effect of  transactions costs on trading volume  depends on the 
other margins of substitution that investors have available. This is a point that 
we have emphasized  elsewhere  in this paper. If  investors can easily  switch 
from taxed and measured trading volume to untaxed, unmeasured trading in 
offshore markets or substitute  assets,  then  transactions costs should have a 
large effect on measured trading volume. If investors can only choose between 
taxed trading on the exchange and holding their assets, then transactions costs 
should have a much smaller effect. None of the econometric studies adequately 
capture the variation over time and countries in the alternatives available to in- 
vestors. 
Fourth, many of the other variables included by Jackson and O’Donnell and 
the other authors are arguably endogenous. The growth rate of stock prices and 
the absolute value of this growth rate (a measure of volatility)  may well re- 
spond to changes in transactions costs. The same can be said of merger and 
acquisition activity. Some of the effects attributed to these variables in the re- 
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Last but not least, transactions costs themselves may be endogenous. Our 
analysis of Sweden shows that the authorities reduced transactions tax rates in 
response to declining trading volume and disappointing revenue. It is possible 
that  the  secular decline  in  U.K.  stamp  duty  rates  from  2  percent  in  the 
late  1970s to  0.5  percent today  has  also occurred because the authorities 
perceive that investors are increasingly able to substitute away from taxable 
trading. 
For all these reasons we believe that the elasticity of trading volume with 
respect to exogenous changes in transactions taxes remains uncertain. The esti- 
mates of Jackson and O’Donnell and others are plausible values to use in rough 
calculations, but not more than that. 
6.4  Conclusion 
Any analysis of a proposed tax change must take account of the behavioral 
responses that may result from it. The main lesson from the international expe- 
rience with securities transaction taxes is that these behavioral responses can 
be quite large, and that they are sensitive to the way  an STT is implemented. 
The important responses seem to be: 
1. A reduction in overall trading. The response here was  greater for the 
United Kingdom than for Sweden’s equity or fixed-income taxes. While vol- 
ume in Swedish money markets fell most dramatically, this was not true for 
total volume in money market securities and their substitutes. The effects on 
total trading are often difficult to measure because trade moves off the market 
where it is taxed. 
2.  A migration of trading into offshore markets for the same securities. Here 
the response was greater for Swedish equities than it was for U.K. equities or 
Swedish fixed-incomes. There is no perfect substitute for a share of Volvo, but 
there are nearly perfect substitutes for Swedish brokerage services to trade 
Volvo. The result was a steady movement away from the use of local brokerage 
services to consummate trades. Similar experiences abound: taxes on futures 
transactions in Tokyo led to the migration of  trade to Osaka and Singapore; 
taxes on stock transactions in Finland (removed as of May 1992)  caused a large 
fraction of local trading to migrate to London; and so on. 
3. A migration of trading into local substitute securities. In the United King- 
dom local trading of  ADRs and in Sweden the trading of forward contracts 
(versus taxed trade in futures) demonstrate that markets can and will  shift 
toward existing substitutes or create new ones when taxes are imposed. Substi- 
tution by the original issuer may also take place. For example, taxation of cor- 
porate equity but not debt (as in the United Kingdom) may lead companies to 
lower capital costs by issuing more debt and less equity, all else equal. 
4. A combination of (2) and (3): A migration of trading into offshore mar- 
kets for substitute securities. ADRs traded in the United States permit untaxed 
trading of a security closely related to the U.K. ordinary stock. 
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will depend on the available alternatives as well as on the specific tax design.’” 
Indeed, alternatives that do not yet exist can be important. The establishment 
of new instruments or trading environments is particularly likely when the tax 
base is large in an absolute sense, since then the fixed costs of establishment 
can be spread over a large number of trades. 
All these responses tend to shrink the tax base as tax rates increase, reducing 
the revenue that might otherwise be expected. A basic principle of public fi- 
nance is that the shrinkage of the tax base is more severe when a tax is levied 
on a good or service that is supplied and demanded elastically. In such circum- 
stances sellers greatly reduce supply rather than accept lower prices, and buy- 
ers greatly  reduce demand rather  than pay higher prices; the tax wedge be- 
tween the seller’s price and the buyer’s price then greatly reduces the quantity 
of the good traded and the revenue that can be raised by the tax. This principle 
can be applied to STTs once one thinks of them as taxes on one or more of the 
resources that are used as inputs to a transaction. Different countries tax differ- 
ent resources. As we have seen, the Swedish system taxes domestic brokerage 
(the domestic resources used in matching buyers and sellers), whereas the U.K. 
system taxes registration  (the resources used to make a transfer of ownership 
legally binding). 
The demand for domestic equity brokerage is highly elastic because invest- 
ors can easily trade abroad and use foreign brokers instead of  domestic bro- 
kers.  Similarly, the demand  for domestic  fixed-income brokerage  is highly 
elastic because it is easy to create local untaxed substitute assets. Accordingly, 
the Swedish STTs  on equities and particularly fixed-income securities pro- 
duced disappointingly little revenue for the Swedish government. 
The demand for registration  appears to be less elastic, at least in the short 
run.”  Trading offshore does not by itself remove the need to make a transfer 
of ownership legally binding, and hence does not shrink the tax base for the 
U.K. securities transaction tax. To reduce their tax liability, investors in U.K. 
equities must trade in closely related but not identical securities (ADRs or UK 
equity derivatives), or must reduce their volume of trading. These alternatives 
are certainly important, but the U.K. securities transaction tax base remains 
large enough for the U.K. government to raise about 800 million pounds a year 
from a 0.5 percent STT on equity transactions. 
What are the lessons from international experience for the U.S. debate on 
securities transaction taxes? Proponents of an STT argue that it would reduce 
trading volume (and negative externalities that are alleged to be associated with 
volume), while raising much-needed revenue for the U.S. Treasury. The “exter- 
nality” argument for an STT requires that investors act to reduce their tax lia- 
30. Any impact of  a tax on parts of  the domestic securities industry is likely to be similarly 
sensitive to the specifics of  the tax and feasible responses to it. 
3 1. Long-run elasticities may be a good deal higher. Evidence for this comes from the secular 
downward trend in U.K. stamp duty rates, which may be attributable to the growing availability 
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bility, but specifically by  reducing trading volume rather than by moving trad- 
ing to untaxed assets or jurisdi~tions.~~  If an STT is to raise much revenue, 
however, investors must not reduce their tax liability too far. Thus there is some 
conflict between these two arguments for an STT, but both arguments clearly 
fail if investors find it easy to trade in untaxed assets or foreign markets. 
The first lesson from international experience is therefore that an STT fails 
when it taxes a transaction input that has close untaxed substitutes. The Swed- 
ish equity transaction tax applied only to transactions using Swedish brokerage 
services, which are highly substitutable with foreign brokerage services. The 
tax has some effect on domestic trading volume (as measured by transactions 
in restricted Swedish shares), but did not reduce the volume of trade in London 
and may even have increased this volume as investors moved trading offshore. 
The Swedish fixed-income transaction tax was a more dramatic failure; invest- 
ors did not even have to move offshore because they were able to find untaxed 
domestic assets that were close substitutes for the taxed assets. 
The British stamp duty has clearly been more successful than the Swedish 
STT, because it taxes registration. This is a necessary input no matter where a 
transaction is carried out, and so the British tax does not give investors incen- 
tives to move trading offshore. In the long run, however, even the British tax is 
vulnerable to innovation as investors discover that they can avoid stamp duty 
by trading ADRs or equity derivatives. This is an example of the point empha- 
sized by Kane (1987),  that long-run elasticities of substitution tend to be much 
larger than short-run elasticities. Governments must continually update their 
tax systems if they are to avoid erosion of the tax base through financial inno- 
vation. 
How much revenue might the U.S. government raise if it imposed a securi- 
ties transaction tax of the British type, at the British rate? The U.S. Congres- 
sional Budget Office (1990)  estimate of $10 billion in annual revenue has been 
widely cited. One way to get a number of this magnitude is to scale up the 
U.K. annual revenue by the trading volume in U.S. equities relative to the trad- 
ing volume in U.K. equities. First, we convert the U.K. annual revenue of 800 
million pounds to dollars; using an exchange rate of $1.7 per pound, this is 
about $1.4 billion. Then we note that U.S. equity trading volume on the NYSE, 
AMEX (American Stock Exchange), and NASDAQ is almost eight times the 
U.K. equity trading volume on the London Stock Exchange, implying revenue 
of about $11 billion. One could get an even higher revenue estimate if  one 
assumed that the U.S. STT would be applied to fixed-income securities, which 
are not taxed under the British system. 
But this revenue estimate ignores the behavioral responses that would surely 
follow the imposition of a U.S. securities transaction tax. Once an STT is in 
32. Note again that a reduction in trading volume is necessary but not sufficient for the exter- 
nality argument to  be valid. Even if an  S'M  reduces trading volume, it might reduce positive- 
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place, investors have the incentive to replace taxed transactions with innovative 
untaxed transactions  or simply to reduce the volume of trade. The Swedish 
experience with a fixed-income STT suggests that substitution makes it hard 
to raise much revenue in the fixed-income markets. In the equity markets, the 
econometric studies of Jackson and O’Donnell(1985) and Ericsson and Lind- 
gren (1992) imply that the long-run elasticity of taxable trading volume with 
respect to transactions costs is in the range of -  1 to -  1.7; that is, a 10  percent 
increase in transactions costs reduces taxable trading volume by  10 to 17 per- 
cent in the long run. The large U.S. investors whose trades are recorded in the 
Frank Russell data base pay about thirty basis points for an average U.S. equity 
trade. A 0.5 percent STT would add fifty basis points to this, reducing taxable 
trading volume by  62 percent if the elasticity is -  1 and by  8 1 percent if the 
elasticity is -  1.7. The implied tax revenue falls proportionally to $4 billion if 
the elasticity is -  1 and to $2 billion if the elasticity is -  1.7. 
It is important  to note that an STT of  given  size has a particularly  large 
impact on U.S. markets because US.  trading costs are presently so low. The 
investors recorded in the Frank Russell data base pay about fifty basis points, 
excluding taxes, when they trade U.K. equities; trading costs in other national 
equity markets are typically even larger. An STT has a much larger propor- 
tional impact when other trading costs are thirty basis points (as in the United 
States) than when other trading costs are fifty basis points or more. The calcu- 
lations above take account of this effect. 
Of course, one may not want to rely too heavily on the econometric methods 
of Jackson and O’Donnell(1985) and Ericsson and Lindgren (1992). An alter- 
native, simple way to estimate the revenue that could be raised by a U.S. STT 
is to scale up the revenue raised by the U.K. securities transaction tax by the 
total capitalization of the U.S. market relative to the U.K. market. U.S. equities 
listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX together have a total capitalization 
almost five times bigger  than the U.K. equities listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. This scale factor of five is smaller than the trading  volume scale 
factor of eight because  U.S. equities trade more actively, just as one would 
expect given the low transaction  costs in U.S. markets. Scaling up the U.K. 
transaction  tax revenue by  a factor of  five gives a revenue estimate of only 
$7 billion. 
One other consideration suggests that investors’ behavioral responses would 
severely limit the revenue of a U.S. STT. The sheer size of U.S. financial mar- 
kets makes it worthwhile for institutions to pay the fixed costs of developing 
and marketing tax-driven financial innovations. From this perspective it is not 
surprising that U.S. markets have been particularly innovative in the past, and 
one should expect similar levels of  innovation in the face of  new taxes. It is 
striking that in no country have the investors in the Frank Russell data base 
paid securities transaction taxes that exceed the other transaction costs in that 
country’s market. Given the low general level of U.S. transaction costs, this 
leads to a pessimistic assessment of the revenue potential of a U.S. securities 
transaction tax. 303  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
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Comment  RenC M. Stulz 
Introduction 
The paper by  Campbell and Froot provides an extremely careful analysis of 
the impact of security transaction taxes (STTs) on security markets. They show 
that these taxes have three effects on the trading of securities: (a) they decrease 
trading in taxed securities; (b) they increase trading in nontaxed substitutes; 
(c) they increase foreign trading of domestic shares at the expense of domestic 
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trading. An important implication of these three effects for the use of STTs as 
a source of tax revenue  is that they raise less funds than one would expect 
based on the transaction volume before their imposition. I fully agree with the 
message of the Campbell and Froot paper. In my discussion, I want to point 
out some additional implications of STTs which are outside the focus of their 
paper. In turn, I discuss the implications of STTs for share ownership, stock 
return volatility, the cost of capital, and the geography of trading. Finally, I talk 
briefly about the political economy of globalization. 
Transaction Taxes and Share Ownership 
If trading is cheap, investors can follow the Wall Street Rule-sell  when 
dissatisfied with management-at  little cost.' This means that they have little 
incentive  to invest resources  to  monitor  management.  As  trading  becomes 
more expensive, investors become locked into their holdings and can increase 
the performance  of  their portfolios through actions designed to improve the 
performance of management. Since STTs increase the cost of trading, this rea- 
soning implies that they increase the monitoring of management  and hence 
improve corporate performance. 
As Campbell and Froot point out, STTs can be avoided by trades in untaxed 
securities which have highly correlated payoffs with the taxed securities. For 
instance, a shareholder who wishes to sell his holding of shares of firm X can 
avoid the transaction tax by engaging in an asset swap whereby he swaps his 
shares of firm X for shares of some other firm. With such a swap, ownership 
of the shares is not affected and no explicit security is exchanged, hence no 
transaction tax is paid. Yet, the investor ends up with a portfolio whose payoffs 
do not depend on the performance  of  firm X shares because he pays to the 
counterparty all the payoffs from his shares of firm X. Hence, for investors 
who can find ways to alter the return distribution of their portfolios without 
paying the tax, the tax affects how these investors trade but not how they moni- 
tor management. 
It is reasonable to think that most of the cost of drawing up a contract to sell 
a payoff pattern is represented by a fixed cost which does not depend on the 
magnitude of the payoffs sold. A swap involving ten times more shares of com- 
pany X for ten times more shares of another firm is not ten times more expen- 
sive to set up. Consequently, one would expect that large investors would find 
it beneficial to use derivatives to alter the return distribution of their portfolios, 
whereas small investors would not. This is because for a small investor the 
fixed cost of the derivative transaction would most likely be greater than the 
tax payment. Hence, for small investors, STTs have a lock-in effect, but it is 
doubtful that they have as much of a lock-in effect for large investors. This 
suggests that STTs penalize small investors relative to large investors. Further, 
if use of the Wall Street Rule by shareholders leads management to pay excess 
1. See Bhide (1993)  for the argument that a low cost of trading increases corporate control costs. 305  International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes 
attention to short-run performance measures at the expense of long-run perfor- 
mance, STTs reduce the use of the rule mostly by small shareholders. Typically, 
those who are concerned about short-termism tend to blame fund managers 
rather than small shareholders,2  so it is difficult to believe that STTs do much 
about short-termism. 
One might argue that a well-designed tax would be such that it could not be 
avoided  through  sales of  payoffs  through  derivative transactions.  This view 
overlooks the fact that, whereas  share transfers are easy to tax, transactions 
which take place outside of organized exchanges are not. Even if the intent is 
to tax trades of payoffs instead of trades of securities, it is unclear how well 
this can be done. Many derivatives have no value when the contract is opened. 
For  example, forward contracts have no value when the parties agree to  the 
forward transaction. Consider an investor who sells the security forward with 
a contract which has a long maturity. Eventually, the security will be sold as 
the forward contract is executed. At that time, the transaction tax will have to 
be paid. The present value of the tax payment is small, though. To make it 
uneconomical for investors to substitute forward sales for cash market sales, 
forward contracts will have to be taxed. Effectively, though, the tax authority 
would have to devise a formula that states that a forward sale is equivalent to 
some fraction of a cash sale. 
Forward contracts are just one example of derivative assets. These contracts 
are the easiest to analyze. To avoid providing incentives to investors to substi- 
tute derivative trades for cash transactions, the tax authority will have to pro- 
vide  complicated formulas that  require precise  valuation  of  the derivative 
trades. There are an infinite number of ways through which payoffs can be sold. 
This means that markets will always be one step ahead of the tax authorities. In 
addition though, it seems unlikely that the tax authorities would know how to 
evaluate each derivative transaction without making valuation mistakes. After 
all, for most derivative securities, there is no unanimously agreed upon valua- 
tion approach. 
Security Wansaction Taxes and Volatility 
It is sometimes suggested that security transaction taxes reduce volatility by 
decreasing trading. It is true that there is substantial empirical evidence which 
shows a positive relation between trading and ~olatility,~  so that a mechanical 
application of this relation suggests that a decrease in trading will indeed re- 
duce volatility. The problem is that the behavior modifications induced by the 
transaction tax themselves change the relation between trading and volatility. 
The argument I want to make is that STTs may increase volatility for a given 
volume of trading, so despite their negative effect on trading volume, they may 
increase volatility. 
2. See, for instance, Jacobs (1991). 
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Note that STTs reduce liquidity. To  see this, suppose that unexpectedly a 
block of shares for firm X is offered for sale on the exchange. To absorb this 
block, investors want a price concession, so that the price of the share drops 
slightly. Investors who are willing to make these trades possible provide liquid- 
ity to the markets? They probably do not intend to hold on to these shares for 
very long, but they are providing an important service. With an STT, investors 
who provide liquidity want the stock price to fall more than in the absence of 
an STT before they buy shares, since their profit from doing so is decreased 
by  the STT. Hence, an STT is likely to increase the short-run volatility of 
share prices. 
If  the concern is that there is excessive volatility because large groups of 
investors may trade without regard for fundamentals but simply to anticipate 
or react to trades by  other large groups of investors, the effect of an STT on 
this excessive volatility is ambiguou~.~  This is because the STT affects the 
incentives of investors who trade on fundamentals as well as the incentives of 
those who do not. Short of carefully modeling the behavior of both classes of 
investors, it is unclear which category reduces its trading the most as the STT 
is introduced. If investors who trade on fundamentals reduce their trading the 
most, it is possible for excessive volatility to increase following the imposition 
of the STT. 
The effect of  an STT on information acquisition is also ambiguous. The 
reward for trading on a given piece of information falls with the STT because 
the cost of trading increases. Hence, one would expect investors to invest less 
in information collection. At the same time, though, the gain from collecting 
information to monitor management increases. Because small investors do not 
monitor management, the STT is likely to decrease information acquisition if 
it ends up favoring large investors over small investors. 
STTs and the Cost of Capital 
Suppose now that the STT cannot be avoided through trades in untaxed sub- 
stitutes. When investors purchase securities, they do so based on their expecta- 
tion of the return net of  trading costs. Consider the case of a tax of 0.5 percent 
which is expected to be maintained forever. In this case, if  investors have  a 
discount rate of 8 percent and expect to hold securities for two years, the un- 
expected imposition of  an STT should decrease stock prices by  3.5 percent 
and increase the before-tax expected return required by investors to hold shares 
by  0.25 percent.6 Hence, the  imposition of  an  STT decreases  shareholder 
wealth and increases the cost of capital of firms. This means that one would 
4.  See Grossman and Miller (1988). 
5. See, for instance, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) for a model where some investors 
6. This number equals 
behave this way. 
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expect an STT to decrease investment within a country and hence to have a 
negative impact on growth. 
STTs and the Geography of Trading 
Governments can tax and regulate within their borders. In the absence of 
cross-border restrictions on capital flows, one expects security markets to grow 
where taxes and regulations are the least onerous. Hence, governments that tax 
securities trades take the risk  of  driving away from their countries  security 
markets altogether. Taxes and regulations imposed in the 1960s in the United 
States played a major role in the creation of the Euromarkets. Taxes and regula- 
tions within  European  countries have played  a major role in the  growth of 
trading of European stocks in London. In particular, the Swedish STT shifted 
trading of Swedish shares to London as discussed by Campbell and Froot. 
In the presence of cross-border restrictions on capital flows, there is a role 
for national stock markets. This is because residents within a country can share 
risks among themselves more efficiently than they can with outside investors. 
In addition, when information flows slowly from one place to another, it makes 
sense for shares to trade where information is generated. Over the past ten 
years, however, barriers to international investment have fallen dramatically 
and technological  advances have eliminated  the  informational advantage of 
proximity. In this  setting, it is unclear  what role there is for national  stock 
markets. 
One plausible scenario is that the Euromarkets will keep growing and will 
extend more to trading in shares. With this scenario, trading in shares would 
progressively  be concentrated  offshore and national  markets would become 
less important, catering mostly to small investors. It is not clear how regulators 
can make the costs of trading offshore higher without imposing cross-border 
restrictions  which  would  lead  to  renewed  market  segmentation.  Hence,  it 
would seem that offshore trading will keep creating pressures for deregulation 
as long as barriers to international investment keep falling. 
STTs and the Political Economy of Globalization 
Over the past ten years, markets have become more integrated mostly be- 
cause of the decrease in barriers to international investment and, to a lesser 
extent, because of technological advances in communication. Although many 
seem to believe that globalization is irreversible, the experience of STTs should 
make us careful about drawing such a sweeping conclusion. In the absence of 
barriers to international investment, trade in securities takes place where it is 
most advantageous, which makes it difficult for countries to tax and regulate 
them. Hence, countries that wish to tax and regulate trade in securities may 
decide that they can only do so effectively  if  they  limit cross-border flows. 
As countries place more restrictions on cross-border flows, offshore markets 
become less liquid and trading flows back to national markets, making it easier 
for governments to regulate and tax securities trading. This is not the first time 
in history that barriers to international investment are low. 308  John Y.  Campbell and Kenneth A. Froot 
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